2018-06-14 |
utils: Add BIT_32 and BIT_64 macros
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When applying some MISRA rules, lots of issues are raised with BIT macro
on AARCH32, and cast on uint32_t would be required (Rule 10.3).
The macros BIT_32 and BIT_64 are then created for 32bit and 64bit.
Then the BIT macro defaults on BIT_64 on AARCH64,
and on BIT_32 on AARCH32.
Signed-off-by: Yann Gautier <yann.gautier@st.com>
Yann Gautier
committed
on 14 Jun 2018
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Add GENMASK macros
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Import GENMASK_32 and GENMASK_64 macros from optee-os (permissive license).
And default GENMASK is set to GENMASK_32 for AARCH32,
and to GENMASK_64 for 64bit arch.
fixes arm-software/tf-issues#596
Signed-off-by: Yann Gautier <yann.gautier@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Le Bayon <nicolas.le.bayon@st.com>
Yann Gautier
committed
on 14 Jun 2018
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Merge pull request #1415 from antonio-nino-diaz-arm/an/spm-fixes
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Minor fixes to SPM
Dimitris Papastamos
authored
on 14 Jun 2018
GitHub
committed
on 14 Jun 2018
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2018-06-13 |
Merge pull request #1402 from glneo/for-upstream-uart
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drivers: ti: uart: Add TI specific 16550 initialization
Dimitris Papastamos
authored
on 13 Jun 2018
GitHub
committed
on 13 Jun 2018
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SPM: Treat SP xlat tables the same as others
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The translation tables allocated for the Secure Partition do not need
to be treated as a special case. They can be put amongst the other
tables mapping BL31's general purpose memory. They will be mapped with
the same attributes as them, which is fine.
The explicit alignment constraint in BL31's linker script to pad the
last page of memory allocated to the Secure Partition's translation
tables is useless too, as page tables are per se pages, thus their
end address is naturally aligned on a page-boundary.
In fact, this patch does not change the existing behaviour. Since
patch 22282bb68a31 ("SPM: Move all SP-related info to SP context
struct"), the secure_partition.c file has been renamed into sp_xlat.c
but the linker script has not been properly updated. As a result, the
SP translation tables are not specifically put at the start of the
xlat_table linker section, the __SP_IMAGE_XLAT_TABLES_START__/_END__
symbols have the same value, the size of the resulting mmap_region
covering these xlat tables is 0 and so it is ignored.
Change-Id: I4cf0a4cc090298811cca53fc9cee74df0f2b1512
Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Sandrine Bailleux
authored
on 6 Jun 2018
Antonio Nino Diaz
committed
on 13 Jun 2018
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xlat v2: Introduce xlat granule size helpers
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The function xlat_arch_is_granule_size_supported() can be used to check
if a specific granule size is supported. In Armv8, AArch32 only supports
4 KiB pages. AArch64 supports 4 KiB, 16 KiB or 64 KiB depending on the
implementation, which is detected at runtime.
The function xlat_arch_get_max_supported_granule_size() returns the max
granule size supported by the implementation.
Even though right now they are only used by SPM, they may be useful in
other places in the future. This patch moves the code currently in SPM
to the xlat tables lib so that it can be reused.
Change-Id: If54624a5ecf20b9b9b7f38861b56383a03bbc8a4
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Antonio Nino Diaz
committed
on 13 Jun 2018
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2018-06-12 |
Fix MISRA Rule 5.3 Part 2
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Use a _ prefix for Macro arguments to prevent that argument from
hiding variables of the same name in the outer scope
Rule 5.3: An identifier declared in an inner scope shall not
hide an identifier declared in an outer scope
Fixed For:
make LOG_LEVEL=50 PLAT=fvp
Change-Id: I67b6b05cbad4aeca65ce52981b4679b340604708
Signed-off-by: Daniel Boulby <daniel.boulby@arm.com>
Daniel Boulby
committed
on 12 Jun 2018
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Fix MISRA Rule 5.3 Part 1
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Conflict with function name and variable name within that function.
Change the name of the function from image_size to get_image_size
to remove conflict and make the function fit the normal project
naming convention.
Rule 5.3: An identifier declared in an inner scope shall not
hide an identifier declared in an outer scope
Fixed For:
make LOG_LEVEL=50 PLAT=fvp
Change-Id: I1a63d2730113e2741fffa79730459c584b0224d7
Signed-off-by: Daniel Boulby <daniel.boulby@arm.com>
Daniel Boulby
committed
on 12 Jun 2018
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2018-06-11 |
drivers: ti: uart: Add TI specific 16550 initialization
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On TI platforms the UART is disabled by default and must be explicitly
enabled using the MDR1 register.
NOTE: The original definition of
http://www.ti.com/lit/ds/symlink/pc16550d.pdf has no MDR register, but
many TI SoCs implementing 16550 do have a quirky MDR register
implemented. So, this should be enabled with TI_16550_MDR_QUIRK
NOTE: In such implementation, the CSR register does not exist.
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Fair <b-fair@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
Benjamin Fair
authored
on 13 Oct 2016
Andrew F. Davis
committed
on 11 Jun 2018
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Adjust BL2_AT_EL3 memory layout
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For the BL2_AT_EL3 configuration, move BL2 higher up to make more
space for BL31. Adjust the BL31 limit to be up to BL2 base. This is
because BL2 is always resident for the BL2_AT_EL3 configuration and
thus we cannot overlay it with BL31.
Change-Id: I71e89863ed48f5159e8b619f49c7c73b253397aa
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 11 Jun 2018
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2018-06-08 |
SDEI: Ensure SDEI handler executes with CVE-2018-3639 mitigation enabled
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When dynamic mitigation is used, the SDEI handler is required to
execute with the mitigation enabled by default, regardless of the
mitigation state for lower ELs. This means that if the kernel or
hypervisor explicitly disables the mitigation and then later when the
event is dispatched, the dispatcher will remember the mitigation state
for the lower ELs but force the mitigation to be on during the SDEI
handler execution. When the SDEI handler returns, it will restore the
mitigation state.
This behaviour is described in "Firmware interfaces for mitigating
cache speculation vulnerabilities System Software on Arm Systems"[0].
[0] https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification
Change-Id: I8dd60b736be0aa9e832b0f92d67a401fdeb417f4
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 8 Jun 2018
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Implement dynamic mitigation for CVE-2018-3639 on Cortex-A76
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The Cortex-A76 implements SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 as defined in
"Firmware interfaces for mitigating cache speculation vulnerabilities
System Software on Arm Systems"[0].
Dynamic mitigation for CVE-2018-3639 is enabled/disabled by
setting/clearning bit 16 (Disable load pass store) of `CPUACTLR2_EL1`.
NOTE: The generic code that implements dynamic mitigation does not
currently implement the expected semantics when dispatching an SDEI
event to a lower EL. This will be fixed in a separate patch.
[0] https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification
Change-Id: I8fb2862b9ab24d55a0e9693e48e8be4df32afb5a
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 8 Jun 2018
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Implement Cortex-Ares 1043202 erratum workaround
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The workaround uses the instruction patching feature of the Ares cpu.
Change-Id: I868fce0dc0e8e41853dcce311f01ee3867aabb59
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 8 Jun 2018
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Add AMU support for Cortex-Ares
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Change-Id: Ia170c12d3929a616ba80eb7645c301066641f5cc
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 8 Jun 2018
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Add support for Cortex-Ares and Cortex-A76 CPUs
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Both Cortex-Ares and Cortex-A76 CPUs use the ARM DynamIQ Shared Unit
(DSU). The power-down and power-up sequences are therefore mostly
managed in hardware, and required software operations are simple.
Change-Id: I3a9447b5bdbdbc5ed845b20f6564d086516fa161
Signed-off-by: Isla Mitchell <isla.mitchell@arm.com>
Isla Mitchell
authored
on 3 Aug 2017
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 8 Jun 2018
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2018-06-07 |
Merge pull request #1404 from soby-mathew/sm/bl_layout_change
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ARM platforms: Change memory layout and update documentation
Dimitris Papastamos
authored
on 7 Jun 2018
GitHub
committed
on 7 Jun 2018
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ARM platforms: Move BL31 below BL2 to enable BL2 overlay
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The patch changes the layout of BL images in memory to enable
more efficient use of available space. Previously BL31 was loaded
with the expectation that BL2 memory would be reclaimed by BL32
loaded in SRAM. But with increasing memory requirements in the
firmware, we can no longer fit BL32 in SRAM anymore which means the
BL2 memory is not reclaimed by any runtime image. Positioning BL2
below BL1-RW and above BL31 means that the BL31 NOBITS can be
overlaid on BL2 and BL1-RW.
This patch also propogates the same memory layout to BL32 for AArch32
mode. The reset addresses for the following configurations are also
changed :
* When RESET_TO_SP_MIN=1 for BL32 in AArch32 mode
* When BL2_AT_EL3=1 for BL2
The restriction on BL31 to be only in DRAM when SPM is enabled
is now removed with this change. The update to the firmware design
guide for the BL memory layout is done in the following patch.
Change-Id: Icca438e257abe3e4f5a8215f945b9c3f9fbf29c9
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
Soby Mathew
committed
on 7 Jun 2018
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2018-05-29 |
Merge pull request #1392 from dp-arm/dp/cve_2018_3639
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Implement workaround for CVE-2018-3639 on Cortex A57/A72/A73 and A75
Dimitris Papastamos
authored
on 29 May 2018
GitHub
committed
on 29 May 2018
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2018-05-25 |
Merge pull request #1395 from antonio-nino-diaz-arm/an/spm-refactor
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SPM: Refactor codebase
Dimitris Papastamos
authored
on 25 May 2018
GitHub
committed
on 25 May 2018
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2018-05-24 |
plat/arm: SPM: Force BL31 to DRAM when SPM is used
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BL31 is running out of space, and the use-case of SPM doesn't require it
to be in SRAM. To prevent BL31 from running out of space in the future,
move BL31 to DRAM if SPM is enabled.
Secure Partition Manager design document updated to reflect the changes.
Increased the size of the stack of BL31 for builds with SPM.
The translation tables used by SPM in Arm platforms have been moved back
to the 'xlat_tables' region instead of 'arm_el3_tzc_dram'. Everything is
in DRAM now, so it doesn't make sense to treat them in a different way.
Change-Id: Ia6136c8e108b8da9edd90e9d72763dada5e5e5dc
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Antonio Nino Diaz
committed
on 24 May 2018
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2018-05-23 |
SPM: Move all SP-related info to SP context struct
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Move all information related to a Secure Partition to the struct
secure_partition_context_t.
This requires an in-depth refactor because most of the previous code of
SPM relied on global information.
Change-Id: I0a23e93817dcc191ce1d7506b8bc671d376123c4
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Antonio Nino Diaz
committed
on 23 May 2018
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context_mgmt: Make cm_init_context_common public
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This function can be currently accessed through the wrappers
cm_init_context_by_index() and cm_init_my_context(). However, they only
work on contexts that are associated to a CPU.
By making this function public, it is possible to set up a context that
isn't associated to any CPU. For consistency, it has been renamed to
cm_setup_context().
Change-Id: Ib2146105abc8137bab08745a8adb30ca2c4cedf4
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Antonio Nino Diaz
committed
on 23 May 2018
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Add support for dynamic mitigation for CVE-2018-3639
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Some CPUS may benefit from using a dynamic mitigation approach for
CVE-2018-3639. A new SMC interface is defined to allow software
executing in lower ELs to enable or disable the mitigation for their
execution context.
It should be noted that regardless of the state of the mitigation for
lower ELs, code executing in EL3 is always mitigated against
CVE-2018-3639.
NOTE: This change is a compatibility break for any platform using
the declare_cpu_ops_workaround_cve_2017_5715 macro. Migrate to
the declare_cpu_ops_wa macro instead.
Change-Id: I3509a9337ad217bbd96de9f380c4ff8bf7917013
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 23 May 2018
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aarch32: Implement static workaround for CVE-2018-3639
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Implement static mitigation for CVE-2018-3639 on
Cortex A57 and A72.
Change-Id: I83409a16238729b84142b19e258c23737cc1ddc3
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 23 May 2018
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Implement static workaround for CVE-2018-3639
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For affected CPUs, this approach enables the mitigation during EL3
initialization, following every PE reset. No mechanism is provided to
disable the mitigation at runtime.
This approach permanently mitigates the entire software stack and no
additional mitigation code is required in other software components.
TF-A implements this approach for the following affected CPUs:
* Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72, by setting bit 55 (Disable load pass store) of
`CPUACTLR_EL1` (`S3_1_C15_C2_0`).
* Cortex-A73, by setting bit 3 of `S3_0_C15_C0_0` (not documented in the
Technical Reference Manual (TRM)).
* Cortex-A75, by setting bit 35 (reserved in TRM) of `CPUACTLR_EL1`
(`S3_0_C15_C1_0`).
Additionally, a new SMC interface is implemented to allow software
executing in lower ELs to discover whether the system is mitigated
against CVE-2018-3639.
Refer to "Firmware interfaces for mitigating cache speculation
vulnerabilities System Software on Arm Systems"[0] for more
information.
[0] https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification
Change-Id: I084aa7c3bc7c26bf2df2248301270f77bed22ceb
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 23 May 2018
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Rename symbols and files relating to CVE-2017-5715
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This patch renames symbols and files relating to CVE-2017-5715 to make
it easier to introduce new symbols and files for new CVE mitigations.
Change-Id: I24c23822862ca73648c772885f1690bed043dbc7
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
Dimitris Papastamos
committed
on 23 May 2018
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Merge pull request #1386 from soby-mathew/sm/dyn_bl31
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Extend dynamic configuration
Dimitris Papastamos
authored
on 23 May 2018
GitHub
committed
on 23 May 2018
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2018-05-22 |
Merge pull request #1393 from geesun/correct_comment
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Correct some typo errors in comment
Dimitris Papastamos
authored
on 22 May 2018
GitHub
committed
on 22 May 2018
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Correct some typo errors in comment
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File: include/common/aarch64/el3_common_macros.S
Change-Id: I619401e961a3f627ad8864781b5f90bc747c3ddb
Signed-off-by: Qixiang Xu <qixiang.xu@arm.com>
Qixiang Xu
committed
on 22 May 2018
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2018-05-21 |
FVP: Add dummy configs for BL31, BL32 and BL33
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This patch adds soc_fw_config, tos_fw_config and nt_fw_config to the FVP.
The config files are placeholders and do not have any useful bindings
defined. The tos_fw_config is packaged in FIP and loaded by BL2 only
if SPD=tspd. The load address of these configs are specified in tb_fw_config
via new bindings defined for these configs. Currently, in FVP, the
soc_fw_config and tos_fw_config is loaded in the page between BL2_BASE
and ARM_SHARED_RAM. This memory was typically used for BL32 when
ARM_TSP_RAM_LOCATION=tsram but since we cannot fit BL32 in that
space anymore, it should be safe to use this memory for these configs.
There is also a runtime check in arm_bl2_dyn_cfg_init() which ensures
that this overlap doesn't happen.
The previous arm_dyn_get_hwconfig_info() is modified to accept configs
other than hw_config and hence renamed to arm_dyn_get_config_load_info().
The patch also corrects the definition of ARM_TB_FW_CONFIG_LIMIT to be
BL2_BASE.
Change-Id: I03a137d9fa1f92c862c254be808b8330cfd17a5a
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>
Soby Mathew
committed
on 21 May 2018
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